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France and the Kafkaesque politics of the European Defence Community1
 
According to the conventional wisdom of many Europeans and non-Europeans alike, 
European integration experienced a sort of arcadia in the early 1950s: European 
governments, especially that of France, were ready to create a federation – a kind of 
United States of Europe – which would dilute the unilateral power of nations in a 
federal whole and bring ancient rivalries to an end. To many people the creation of a 
federal state still constitutes the real target of the European project – either its great 
hope or its great fear. This target was acknowledged in the Schuman Declaration on 9 
May 1950 in Paris, in which Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, declared 
that putting Franco-German coal and steel production under a common authority was 
the first step towards a European federation.2 What I seek to explain here is that such an 
opportunity never really existed, because although it made use of the idea of the 
federation in order to win indispensable backing for its projects from the United States, 
the construction of a federal Europe was never on the agenda of the French government. 
The United States’ diagnosis of the causes of the unremitting conflicts in Europe 
highlighted the weaknesses of the continent’s overall political and, hence, economic 
organisation. Europe constituted a mosaic of small countries, each fiercely protective of 
its national sovereignty, in a permanent state of rivalry with the others, and in constant 
competition for resources which – to the U.S.’s way of thinking – should be common 
and managed for the benefit of all. This rivalry and competition was identified as being 
responsible for the state of recurrent war afflicting Europe. 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this paper, entitled ‘The United States’ Ideas for Europe’s political reorganisation 
and the European response: an opportunity lost?’, was presented at the conference ‘The Lost Decade. The 
1950s in European economy, society and culture’ at Cardiff University, 11–13 July 2007. 
2 The text of the Schuman declaration can be downloaded from the European navigator website: 
www.ena.lu
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If the diagnosis seemed self-evident to the U.S., so did the remedy: only by 
consigning the dogma of national sovereignty and the illusion of self-sufficiency to the 
past and adopting the U.S. model for political and economic organisation might Europe 
put an end to its perpetual cycle of wars and enter into an age of peace and prosperity 
comparable to that enjoyed by the United States. Given that the United States had been 
forced to enter into the last two European conflicts – the First and Second World Wars – 
the Americans believed they had the right to demand that Europe solve the causes of its 
problems once and for all. According to the U.S. senator and future U.S. Secretary of 
State, John Foster Dulles, in 1948:  
Twice within the last twenty-five years the United States has become deeply involved in the 
wars originating between the independent, unconnected sovereignties of Europe. It has been 
demonstrated that the world has so shrunk that European wars can no longer, as during the 
last century, be confined to Europe. Therefore, it is not merely of self-interest to Europe, but 
of vital concern to us, that there be not restored in Europe the conditions which inherently 
give rise to such wars. From a purely selfish standpoint any American program for peace 
must include a federated continental Europe.3
Such a reorganisation had to ensure more efficient, as well as more logical 
management of the continent’s economic resources – an indispensable part of post-war 
recovery. The target was no longer the self-sufficiency of the nation-states, but a 
prosperous union comparable to that of the United States. The main administrator of the 
Marshall Plan, Paul Hoffman, did not hesitate to make such a comparison to the heads 
of Europe in 1949:  
The fact that we have in the United States a single market of 150 million consumers has 
been indispensable to the strength and efficiency of our economy. The creation of a 
                                                 
3 ‘The Unification of Western Europe’ (4 June 1948), John Foster Dulles Papers Collection, Seeley G. 
Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University. 
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permanent freely trading area comprising 270 million consumers in Western Europe would 
have a multitude of helpful consequences.4
Two years later it was General Eisenhower, in his role as Supreme Allied Commander 
of Europe, who described his vision of Europe to the English Speaking Union in 
London: 
Once united, the farms and factories of France and Belgium, the foundries of Germany, the 
rich farmlands of Holland and Denmark, the skilled labor of Italy, will produce miracles for 
the common good. In such unity is a secure future for these peoples. […] The establishment 
of a workable European federation would go far to create confidence among people 
everywhere that Europe was doing its full and vital share in giving this cooperation.5
As far the economy was concerned, the response of the European countries 
could only be positive: achieving economic recovery was a vital prerequisite to political 
stability. European leaders shared the concerns of their U.S. counterparts about the 
expansion of communism. They wanted to ensure the proper functioning of the system 
and to satisfy the needs of their citizens – thus avoiding that they looked at communism 
as an alternative. 
Introducing radical changes in the political and economic structures of Europe in 
an attempt to achieve this, however, was quite another matter. Although they were ready 
to make essential constitutional changes to avoid such concentrations of power as had 
been allowed to accumulate in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, European governments 
focused all their efforts on overcoming the ravages of war. Thus the words of Hoffman, 
cited above, were a reminder two years after the launching of the Marshall Plan that the 
Europeans had taken no steps towards implementing a fundamental part of the plan: that 
calling for the dissolution of the continent’s internal frontiers. 
                                                 
4 Text of statement made by Paul G. Hoffman on the European economy, 31 October 1949. Downloaded 
from the webpage of the Harry S. Truman Library: www.trumanlibrary.org (30 May 2007). 
5 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, ‘Unity of Western Europe: Essential for World Security’, 3 July 1951, 
in R. Ducci, L’Europa Incompiuta (Padova: CEDAM, 1970), pp. 201–6. 
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Meanwhile, Washington was desperately looking for a European country that 
would adopt its policies. The first candidate was the United Kingdom. As the only 
European country whose institutions had endured the test of war admirably however, 
the U.K. had no intention of replacing them with European ones. In a personal message 
which marks the beginning of the distancing of the United Kingdom from projects 
towards European unification, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin, 
communicated to his U.S. colleague, Dean Acheson in 1949: 
The principal objective of our policy is to reconcile our position as a world power, as a 
member of the British Commonwealth, and as a member of the European community. We 
believe that we can effect this reconciliation but that if we are to do so, we cannot accept 
obligations in relations to Western Europe which would prevent or restrict the 
implementation of our responsibilities elsewhere.6
Following the British rebuff, only one reasonable option remained: France. Yet 
Paris saw the situation in much the same way that London did, the main difference 
being that its international standing was much weaker than Britain’s. Whilst travelling 
around France during the summer of 1949, George F. Kennan, the Director of the Policy 
Planning Staff of the United States Department of State observed: 
[…] the French at that time had only one preoccupation; and this was their anxiety lest there 
be some form of relationship between the British and ourselves from which they might be 
excluded. […]. […] they were full of suspicion and resentment if any discussion were held 
to which they were not a party. To them at that time the idea of taking any sort of leadership 
among continental powers, independently of ourselves and the British, was utterly foreign 
[…]. In short, the French with whom I spoke were simply incapable of understanding what I 
was talking about.7
And what exactly was it that Kennan was talking about? 
                                                 
6 ‘Personal Message to the Secretary of State from Mr Bevin, dated 25th October 1949’, Foreign Relations 
of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1949, vol. 4, pp. 347–8. 
7 G.F. Kennan, Memoirs. 1925–1950 (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press Book, 1967), pp. 454–7. 
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A continental union, sufficiently detached from Britain to have some chance of absorbing 
the Germans into something larger than themselves, sufficiently detached from ourselves 
and the Canadians to be truly continental in character, quite separate from the Atlantic pact, 
and thus eligible, so to speak, to provide a framework into which the smaller Central and 
Eastern European Countries could eventually be fitted, as and when suitable possibilities 
might arise […]. What was important was to guide the movement toward unification along 
these lines, so that when finally realized it could provide the institutional foundation for a 
stable Europe […]. […] the driving force behind any movement toward political unification 
on the continent, and the dominant influence within any federal union that came into being 
would be naturally and unquestionably, France.8
The pressure applied by the likes of Kennan and Hoffman was reinforced by 
Dean Acheson. The day before Hoffman’s speech, Acheson wrote a letter to his French 
colleague, Robert Schuman, entrusting him with the task of leading the integration of 
Europe, as well as that of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).9 As a result, the 
French government and its Ministry of Foreign Affairs – the Quai d'Orsay – sought to 
devise a plan that would both satisfy the wishes of the United States and safeguard the 
interests of France. They were unable to come up with a convincing strategy. 
Nonetheless, they were certain of the need to contain the FRG. A note by François 
Seydoux, the director of the European desk at the Quai d'Orsay, sheds considerable 
light on the ideas held by the Ministry: 
Germany will not recover her complete independence; the current system of tutelage will 
pass directly to another system under which other restrictions will limit her freedom, but 
these limitations will have to be assumed by all the members […]. No time will exist during 
which Germany can be the master of her destiny; she will exit the present frame to enter 
into another one, easier to bear, firstly because it will be less rigid, secondly because it will 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 Letter from Acheson to Schuman (30 October 1949), in FRUS, 1949, vol. 3, pp. 621–5. 
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not be confined to the borders of Germany. Germany will enjoy equality of rights, but this 
equality will only be applied to limited rights.10
At the same time the head of the General Commissariat for the Modernisation and 
Equipment of the French Economy, Jean Monnet, set himself the target of turning 
France’s economy into the continent’s leading one. To achieve this, he considered it 
necessary to transform production in six basic sectors – electricity, cement, agricultural 
machinery, railroads, coal, and steel – which would act as levers for other parts of the 
economy.11 Monnet understood that his target could not be met if relations between 
France and Germany, including the future standing of the FRG, were not transformed. 
Before the war, Germany had been the continent’s leading power, and it had the 
potential to recover this position once the occupation of its territory and the associated 
restrictions came to an end. Moreover, with coal and steel the principal industrial 
sectors at the time, French industry was suffering the effects of a serious structural 
handicap due to its lack of coking coal – indispensable for the production of steel – 
within French territory. Having to import coking coal from Germany inevitably meant 
that French production costs were higher than those of the Germans, and therefore 
French-produced goods less competitive on the market.  
During April and May 1950, Monnet came to the conclusion that the only long-
term solution to the structural problem undermining French industry was to prevent the 
German government from having sole use of its coal resources. The problem was how 
to go about achieving this without upsetting the United States, which wanted to see an 
                                                 
10 Note de la Direction d’Europe, Quai d’Orsay, ‘L’intégration de l’Allemagne dans l’Europe 
occidentale’, 7 April 1950, Europe 1944–1960, Généralités, vol. 133, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères 
(hereafter MAE). 
11 On the Monnet Plan see Frances M.B. Lynch, France and the International Economy: from Vichy to 
the Treaty of Rome (London: Routledge, 1997). 
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end to the occupation of the FRG and its integration – without any form of 
discrimination – in Europe.  
Monnet recognised that the only way was to shift the capacity for decision-
making to a supra-national body entrusted with overseeing all countries’ claims. In this 
case, operating outside the national framework would serve France’s interests rather 
than working to her detriment. Presented as such, it was easy to convince the French 
government to sidestep the nation-state. In a memorandum sent by Monnet to Robert 
Schuman on 3 May 1950, six days before the historic declaration, no mention was made 
of leading a movement for the federalisation of the continent; Monnet’s sole concern 
was to guarantee the future competitiveness of the French coal and steel industry.12  
However, even if no deadline was set for its completion and no road-map 
established, the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950 presented a plan to the public for 
the progressive creation of a European federation in which the pooling of the 
continent’s coal and steel resources was to be just the first step. As such, a plan to settle 
a specific problem faced by French industry was introduced in a more generous light, 
thereby allowing the French government to win the support of the United States. 
Despite being one of the main victims of German militarism during the preceding 70 
years, France was offering to promote the integration of her neighbour within the new 
Europe heralded by the Schuman Plan. The initiative was accepted, and the first 
European community was born, comprising France, the FRG, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Italy, and the Netherlands. The reality, however, was that France had not mapped out 
any additional plans for implementation after the Schuman Declaration, and it was 
inevitable that she would be forced to demonstrate the sincerity of her proposal in the 
end. Only four months later, following North Korea’s attack on the south of the 
                                                 
12 ‘Le Mémorandum Monnet du 3 mai 1950’, Politique Étrangère, 1 (1993), pp. 121–5. 
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peninsula – seeming confirmation of its worst fears of Soviet plans13 – Washington 
demanded the rearmament of the FRG within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) as a condition for committing itself to the defence of Western Europe against 
an eventual Soviet attack. A rearmed FRG was an unacceptable prospect for Paris back 
then, and besides, France had proposed some sort of exclusive right of control over the 
evolution of the FRG in the Schuman Plan. Hence, the American plan was seen as an 
alternative to its own demands, and one that threatened to be more attractive to 
Germany, as the country would recover its military capacity – which was of much 
greater political significance than her coal and steel resources – without having to share 
her sovereignty within a wider federal framework.  
France’s only option to regain the position secured by the launching of the 
Schuman Plan was to respond according to its framework by suggesting the creation of 
a European army under the authority of the European institutions, which would 
supersede all links between the national armies and member countries. The proposal to 
create a federal army to serve a federal Europe was set down in the Pleven Plan of 24 
October 1950. (It was out of this that the projects for the European Defence Community 
[1952] and a constitution for Europe [1953] would develop.)14 The Pleven Plan won the 
support of the United States, not only because it committed France to the rearmament of 
Germany, but also because it served to further the process of federalisation initiated five 
months earlier. France was faced with having to translate her written words into action, 
a step that she had never actually contemplated taking. Yet how could France now say 
that she had no intention of creating a European federation or of establishing France as 
an element within this union? The discredit to Paris would be absolute, and, moreover, 
                                                 
13 See document NSC–68 by Paul Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the US Department of 
State in S. Nelson Drew (ed.), NSC–68 Forging the Strategy of Containment with Analyses by Paul H. 
Nitze (Washington: National Defense University, 1994). 
14 The texts of the Pleven Plan, the European Defence Community treaty, and the 1953 project for a 
European Constitution can be downloaded from the European Navigator website: www.ena.lu
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there was a real risk that France would lose control over the future evolution of 
Germany. In this second point lies the key to understanding French attitudes over the 
next four years. As long as she could preserve the status quo, France would be the 
master of the destiny of the FRG and every passing day celebrated as a victory. The 
result was somewhat paradoxical: on the one hand Europe advanced towards a 
federation with the measures adopted by the conference of the European Defence 
Community (EDC); on the other, the French government did everything possible to 
delay the conclusion of the process. The situation was truly Kafkaesque, and nobody in 
France knew how to put an end to it whilst saving the country’s face. By 1953 the path 
that had been taken in May 1950 was highly contested in private in the corridors of 
power, but rarely was it discussed in the public arena – official records leave little doubt 
about France’s commitment to the building of a federal Europe as envisaged by the 
United States. Its commitment was nonexistent: its preoccupation was to find a way of 
avoiding it. 
At the presentation of the project for a European constitution on 9 March 1953, 
Paul Henri Spaak, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs and president of the assembly 
entrusted with drafting the document, drew a parallel between the situation in Europe 
and that faced by the United States in 1787: 
Other men more than a century and a half ago faced difficulties similar to our own; they 
confronted problems scarcely different from those that appear today before us, they shared 
our doubts, but they were daring and they had success. Why should our destiny be any 
different? If we show the same spirit of adventure and the same courage, there is no valid 
reason that should prevent us from obtaining the same success. This task concerns only us; 
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it is we who are responsible for giving old Europe her force, her greatness and her future 
projection.15
The French Minister of Foreign Affairs and the first president of this European 
community, Georges Bidault, responded, ‘Greetings to the seekers of adventure.’16
The same parallel, albeit for different purposes, was drawn by the European 
Desk of the Quai d'Orsay on 26 January 1953, when in a note entitled ‘European 
Politics’ it identified the United States’ error in believing that France might be 
interested in the unification of Europe as an end in itself: 
[…] we are afraid that our American friends, being inspired by the American precedent of 
1787, have an extremely simplistic conception of the uniting of Europe and do not know the 
gravity of the problems that the policy of the integration of Europe raises for the European 
states and particularly France, with worldwide responsibilities […]. If France has taken the 
initiative in projects aimed at the common management, in certain areas, of the resources 
and energy of the countries of continental Europe, this in no way means abandoning its 
position as a world power nor neglecting any responsibilities with regard to the French 
Union.17
If this were not clear enough, the text continued: ‘The uniting of Europe is not for us a 
mystical phenomenon, but politics. We are seeking to carry out transfers of sovereignty 
appropriate to settling those problems for which the solution exceeds the national 
framework’. In other words, European politics sought no more than to contribute 
specific European solutions to those questions which could not be tackled within 
national borders. It was ‘with the aim of solving such problems that we have committed 
ourselves to the creation of functional communities that carry out, in specific areas, the 
                                                 
15 Daniela Preda, Sulla Soglia dell’Unione (Milano: Jaca Book, 1994), pp. 334–5.  
16 Ibid.  
17 ‘Politique Européenne’, Direction Générale des Affaires Politiques, Europe, Direction d’Europe 
Centrale, 26 January 1953, Papiers Bidault, 457 AP 44, Archives Nationales (hereafter AN), Paris.  
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merger of European resources.’18 In this context the political community had an 
obvious role: ‘the functional communities must not be technocratic but they must be 
submitted, in the largest possible measure, to procedures of democratic control’, which 
excludes the possibility ‘of constituting a federal European state’. The author of the note 
goes on to point out the error of using concepts whose meaning diverges from the true 
targets being pursued: ‘although they appear in Article 38 of the project that institutes 
the European Defence Community Treaty, it seems preferable to avoid the words 
“federation” and “confederacy” since both come from a dangerous conception 
according to which Europe must be constituted from above by creating a political 
organisation common to six states’. The targets of Paris were much more specific: ‘Our 
European policy […] is designed to solve precise problems: the promotion of European 
productivity, the implementation of balanced measures for armament and Germany’s 
contribution to defence’. The balancing act was clear: ‘this policy bears both a condition 
and a limit: the maintenance of France’s position in the world and the constant and 
effective support of the American government.’19
Bidault, who understood that there was no going back for his country, summed 
up the French position perfectly: ‘If, after having convinced the Americans and General 
Eisenhower, who was not initially a supporter, of the good sense of building a European 
army, we now reject such an idea, we risk never being taken seriously again.’ Thus the 
French found themselves in an impossible situation, in which, ‘it is necessary to 
construct Europe but, simultaneously, France must be present in the world’, since 
‘France, the United Kingdom and the United States must govern the western world.’20
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid.  
20 See ‘Compte rendu de la réunion tenue le mercredi 11 février à 20’30h chez M. Bidault sur 
l’organisation politique de l’Europe’, 11 February 1953, Papiers Bidault, 457 AP 38, AN, Paris. 
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Due to the perennial instability of the governments of the Fourth Republic, by 
the early summer of 1954 France was immersed in a deep crisis, which the military 
disaster at Dien Bien Phu in French Indochina only aggravated.21 The atmosphere 
allowed for the appointment in June of a Prime Minister with no links to the European 
project, which was in fact a prerequisite to finding a way out of the impasse. The 
politician in question was Pierre Mendès France. Mendès France recognised that finding 
a solution meant recognising France’s real intentions and reorienting the project in a 
direction with which all the leading players were happy. He first tried to alter the terms 
of the EDC, which was still pending ratification in France. He put forward a protocol of 
application whose primary goals were stripping the commissariat – the main 
supranational organ of the EDC – of any real political power, reaffirming its purely 
technical nature, and submitting it to the right of veto of the nation-states for eight 
years, whilst denying it the possibility of recourse to the European court of justice for 
the same period. Mendès France also argued for the right of each member country to 
leave the Community should U.S. and British troops be withdrawn from the continent or 
Germany reunified. Moreover, he repealed Article 38 of the Treaty of the EDC, which 
envisaged a federal or confederal Europe based on the division of powers, with a 
representative bicameral system. France’s stance represented quite a snub to the other 
five associate members, whose parliaments, with the exception of Italy’s, had already 
ratified the treaty. It also marked a clear rejection of the position the country had 
adopted during the preceding four years in order to secure U.S. support.  
It was the United Kingdom which gained the most from the turn of events, 
evaluating the actions taken by Mendès France as follows: ‘Her Majesty’s Government 
recognizes that the protocol will be a severe disappointment to many protagonists of 
                                                 
21 On the Dien Bien Phu disaster and its consequences see for example Lawrence S. Kaplan, Denise 
Artaud, and Mark Rubin (eds), Dien Bien Phu and the Crisis of Franco-American Relations, 1954–1955 
(Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1990). 
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closer European Union and will raise serious problems for those governments which 
have already ratified the EDC treaty’; but it ‘seems to be based on a realistic assessment 
of the limits to the abandonment of national sovereignty.’22 It was the United Kingdom 
that agreed secretly to help Mendès France extricate his country from the situation at a 
meeting in Chartwell attended by Churchill, Eden, and the French Prime Minister, albeit 
only after the French parliament had vetoed the project of the EDC.23 Amongst U.S. 
representatives the disappointment was enormous. The response of Bedell Smith, 
Undersecretary of State of the United States, was typical. He pointed out that ‘the 
American leaders had seen the EDC as constituting not only a way of rearming 
Germany with the strongest of guarantees, but as a vital step towards the federation of 
Europe and they regret the regression that the protocol marks with regard to this latter 
goal’.24
Assured of British support, Mendès France managed to put an end to the EDC 
and the federal principles endorsed four years earlier with a procedural vote in the 
National Assembly in Paris on 30 August 1954. In a speech the previous day referring 
to Article 38 of the Treaty, he made it clear that, ‘it is very important that we save the 
future for ourselves and that we do not unite, politically, in a definitive way with the 
European community with the exception, perhaps, of the principle of a democratic 
assembly’. He added that it was important to calm the public, so as ‘not to give them the 
impression that we are heading towards an unknown political formation [...].’ The 
conclusion was clear: ‘we are faithful to the alliance that provides our security [NATO] 
and our conception of the alliance is that of a cordial cooperation between associates 
                                                 
22 ‘Démarche britannique au sujet du Protocole d’application du Traité de C.E.D. 17 August 1954’, 
Europe 1944–60, Généralités, vol. 76, MAE Paris.  
23 Conversations at Chartwell with Monsieur Mendès France on 23 August 1954. PREM 11/672; U.K. 
Cabinet meeting in CAB 128/27, CC (54) 57 , 27 August 1954 in Public Record Office, Kewth   
Gardens; Pierre Mendès France, Choisir. Conversations avec Jean Bothorel (Paris: Stock, 1974), pp. 75–
6.
24 Bedell Smith, 16 August 1954, Telegram from Henri Bonnet, French ambassador in the United States 
to Pierre Mendès France, DPMF C.E.D. 2 (Bruxelles), Fondation Pierre Mendès France, París. 
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with equal rights who debate their common interests together, while each party remains 
the judge of its essential and vital interests.’25
An epoch was drawing to a close. Despite its brevity, the four-year period was 
one of intense politicking: it is fundamental to an understanding the why’s and 
wherefore’s of the integration of Western Europe. In his autobiography Man Without a 
Face, Markus Wolf, chief of the East German foreign intelligence service, alludes to the 
battle in which he participated, affirming that the EDC, ‘was finally blocked by the 
nationalism of the French rather than anything our intelligence service did to discredit 
the project.’26 An opportunity to convert Western Europe into a federation never really 
existed, because neither the French government, nor indeed the other European 
governments, wanted to go beyond the empty promises designed to obtain the backing 
of the United States. 
The re-construction of Europe started in 1957 with the signing of the Treaty of 
Rome.27 It sought to establish a common market among its members, but whereas the 
Schuman Declaration had spoken in terms of a European federation, the treaty was 
designed to work towards ‘ever closer union’.28 Never again have the terms ‘federal’ or 
‘confederal’ been used in an official text to define the final target of the European 
project. Indeed, the writers of the stillborn European constitution of 2004 contented 
themselves with establishing in Article 3.1 on the Union Objectives that, ‘the Union’s 
aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples’. Similarly, Tony 
Blair, then British Prime Minister, asserted in the foreword of ‘The White Paper on the 
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe’ that, ‘the treaty also makes it plain that 
                                                 
25 Pierre Mendès France, Gouverner c’est choisir (1954–1955) (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), pp. 258–91. 
26 Markus Wolf, Man Without a Face. The Autobiography of Communism’s Greatest Spymaster (New 
York: Public Affairs, 1997), p. 54. 
27 The text of the Treaty of Rome can be downloaded from the European navigator website: www.ena.lu
28 Ibid. 
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the European Union is not and will not be a federal superstate’.29 The Reform Treaty 
agreed on at the EU informal summit in Lisbon on 18–19 October 2007 has not 
modified this point.30
                                                 
29 White Paper on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, Presented to Parliament by the 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs By Command of Her Majesty, September 
2004, Cm 6309, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2004; The European Convention, The Secretariat: 
Draft of Articles 1 to 16 of the Constitutional Treaty, Brussels, 6 February 2003, CONV 528/03. 
30 On the Reform Treaty see the dossier in EurActiv.com: http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/eu-
reform-treaty/article-163412 (28 October 2007) 
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